Making Banks Safe to Fail: Ten Years Later

Randall D. Guynn
Head of the Financial Institutions Group
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP

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Making Banks Safe to Fail

OUTLINE

- Too Big (Systemic) to Fail Problem
  - What is it?
  - Economics of Bailouts
  - What’s Wrong with Bailouts?
  - Potential Solutions to the TBTF Problem

- Making Banks Safe to Fail
  - What Makes the Banking System Vulnerable to Contagion?
  - Resolution Planning
  - What has Changed Since 2008?
  - SPOE Resolution Strategy
  - Making SPOE Operational
The too-big-to-fail problem arises if government officials believe they cannot allow one or more banks to fail without risking panics, runs and contagion throughout the banking system.

- Such contagion would almost certainly result in a severe contraction in the supply of money and credit (i.e., a collapse of the banking system).
- Such a contraction could result in serious, long-term harm to the wider economy, including a sharp drop in capital market prices and real estate values, a severe contraction in economic output, a spike in unemployment and quite possibly political instability, riots, authoritarianism and even war.

Such a situation presents a dilemma to government officials: allow the bank (or banks) to fail or use public funds to bail it (them) out.
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Economics of bailouts

Faced with a choice between the potential collapse of the banking system if one or more banks are allowed to fail and bailing out the bank(s), most government officials have chosen and will almost certainly in the future choose bailout as the lesser of two evils, regardless of their political leaning.

In essence, the potential social costs of bailout, while substantial, are expected to be materially less than the potential social costs of allowing the bank(s) to fail.

The economic literature shows that fire sales do not merely result in a transfer of value from losers to winners, but a deadweight loss on society by misallocating assets from higher- to lower-valued users.
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What’s wrong with bailouts?

Moral Hazard

- Bailouts foster moral hazard by insulating shareholders and bondholders against losses.
- If shareholders are insulated against losses, they will allow or even encourage their banks to take greater risks in order to increase the probability of greater returns.
- If bondholders are insulated against losses, they will not monitor their banks as efficiently as they would if they bore the full risk of their investments.

Unfair

- Bailouts are also unfair to the shareholders and bondholders of smaller, less complex banks, which are not insulated against losses.
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Making Banks Safe to Fail
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE TBTF PROBLEM

- Potential Solutions to the TBTF Problem
  - Ex-Ante Solutions: Reduce the Probability of Failure
    - Higher Capital and Liquidity Requirements
    - Activity Limits: Volcker Rule, Glass-Steagall Act, Ban on Fractional Reserve Banking, Narrow Banking, etc.
    - Break-up and Maximum Cap on Asset Size
      - E.g., Simon Johnson: 4% of GDP ≈ $570 bn in assets
  - Ex-Post Solutions: Reduce the Consequences Given Failure
    - Recovery and Resolution Planning
    - SPOE Resolution Strategies
    - Sufficient TLAC to Make SPOE Feasible
    - Early Resolution Triggers Based on RCEN / RLEN Projections
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“Lombard Street [the modern banking system] is by far the greatest combination of economical power and economical delicacy the world has ever seen.”

- Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street : A Description of the Money Market (1873)

Lombard Street = Fractional Reserve Deposit Banking = Maturity / Liquidity Transformation

- Taking demand deposits (i.e., borrowing cash from depositors in return for legally binding promises to repay the same amount in cash on demand) to invest in
- A pool of assets in the form of a fractional reserve of cash (e.g., 10% of the bank’s demand deposit liabilities) and the rest in the form of long-term loans or other illiquid assets

- Fractional reserve deposit banking is invariably combined with:
  - Maturity transformation which transforms long-term assets into demand deposit money.
  - Liquidity transformation which transforms illiquid assets into demand deposit money.
Maturity / Liquidity Transformation is one of the principal ways in which the modern banking system provides social value to the wider economy

- Maturity / liquidity transformation is the process by which the modern commercial banking system provides a flow of money and credit to the wider economy that can be many times the amount of money issued by central banks.
- The flow of credit produced by this process fuels economic growth and jobs creation by providing a stable source of funding at a reasonable cost to entrepreneurs who otherwise would not have sufficient capital at a reasonable cost to fund their long-term projects.
- It allows anyone with a great innovation (e.g., the assembly line, the microcomputer, the smartphone) to create attractive new jobs and compete effectively.
- Without a healthy flow of money and credit, our modern economy would stop growing, shrink or even screech to a halt.
However, Maturity / Liquidity Transformation makes the banking system vulnerable to runs and contagion.

“Contagion . . . is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent due to the fire sale of assets that are necessary to fund withdrawals and the resulting decline in asset prices triggered by such sales.”

- Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion (2016)

A common shock, such as the unexpected nationwide drop in real estate prices in 2007 and 2008, can spark fear of widespread bank failures.

Potential for:
- Widespread panic and contagion
- Sudden and violent contraction in the supply of money and credit
- Severe long-term economic recession or depression

A bailout is the lesser of two evils if a credible resolution strategy is not available and the alternative would be a potential collapse of the financial system.
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Credible Resolution Strategy
- Recapitalization and continuation or orderly wind-down of material operations using “single-point-of-entry” resolution strategy

Resolution Readiness
- Increased capital
- Increased usable TLAC
- Increased liquidity
- Ability to prevent mass terminations of QFCs
- Secured support agreements to recapitalize subsidiaries
- Timely bankruptcy / resolution triggers
- Advance recovery and resolution planning
- Coordination and cooperation with foreign regulators
### Key Features of SPOE Resolution Strategy

- Developed for G-SIBs, but adaptable to other systemically important financial groups
- Only top-tier parent of a U.S. G-SIB is put into a bankruptcy or resolution proceeding
- All material operating subsidiaries are recapitalized, stabilized and kept out of their own bankruptcy / resolution proceedings
- Preserves systemically critical operations
- Material operating subsidiaries are sold, wound down in an orderly fashion or continued as part of a smaller, simpler group

### Evolution

- Originally developed by the FDIC under OLA, with input from the Federal Reserve and the private sector
- Adapted to work under existing Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, with workarounds
- Proposed Chapter 14 version 2.0 (e.g., FIBA) would facilitate SPOE under the Bankruptcy Code
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SPOE Resolution Strategy
STEP 1: HYPOTHETICAL U.S. G-SIB STRUCTURE BEFORE FAILURE

Note: This is a hypothetical and greatly simplified U.S. G-SIB structure. The location of various legal entities, including whether they are in a separate legal chain or in a chain with a domestic insured bank, varies from group to group. Asset management entities are not shown.
### Top-Tier BHC Stand-alone Balance Sheet ($bn)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Other HQLAs</td>
<td>Unsecured long-term debt (external TLAC debt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHC Deposits in U.S. Bank</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to U.S. Broker-Dealer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of U.S. Bank</td>
<td>Unsecured short-term debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of U.S. Broker-Dealer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures used in this SPOE hypothetical are meant to be illustrative only.*

**Note:** This is a BHC stand-alone balance sheet, which shows only BHC investments in OpCos, and not the OpCos’ assets and liabilities. A consolidated balance sheet would show that the firm has $850bn – $1tn in assets.
**SPOE Resolution Strategy**

**STEP 2: HYPOTHETICAL LOSSES RESULTING IN FAILURE**

**Losses in Subs ($bn)**

- **U.S. Bank:** $40 Loss
  - $35 Remaining Equity
- **U.S. Broker-Dealer:** $5 Loss
  - $10 Remaining Equity
- **Foreign Broker-Dealer:** $5 Loss
  - $5 Remaining Equity

**Total Losses:** $50 bn

**Remaining BHC Equity:** $50 bn
## SPOE Resolution Strategy

**STEP 2: HYPOTHETICAL LOSSES RESULTING IN FAILURE**

### Top-Tier BHC Stand-alone Balance Sheet After Losses and Before Recapitalization ($bn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Other HQLAs</td>
<td>Unsecured long-term debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHC Deposits in U.S. Bank</td>
<td>Unsecured long-term debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to U.S. Broker-Dealer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of U.S. Bank</td>
<td>Equity of U.S. Brokers-Derail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75→35</td>
<td>15→10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
<td>10→5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10→5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
<td>Equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>100→50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200→150</td>
<td>200→150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Davis Polk**
**SPOE Resolution Strategy**

**STEP 3: OPCOS RECAPITALIZED PRIOR TO BANKRUPTCY/OLA PROCEEDING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Top-Tier BHC Stand-alone Balance Sheet After Recapitalization Actions ($bn)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assets</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Other HQLAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHC Deposits in U.S. Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to U.S. Broker-Dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances to Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of U.S. Broker-Dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Foreign Broker-Dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured long-term debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsecured short-term debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contributions of capital and liquidity to OpCos must be structured to be resilient against avoidance and other legal challenges in BHC bankruptcy or OLA proceedings.

* Recapitalization of a U.S. G-SIB’s operating subsidiaries must occur before the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding under existing law. It can occur either before or after the FDIC is appointed as receiver of a covered company in an OLA proceeding because of various provisions in OLA that deal with potential creditor challenges.
Recapitalized OpCos are transferred to either a New HoldCo (Bankruptcy Code) or Bridge Financial Company (OLA) owned by the Resolution Trust for the benefit of BHC’s bankruptcy estate (Bankruptcy Code) or receivership (OLA).

In a bankruptcy proceeding, the transfer is made pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Left-behind debts of BHC subject to plan of reorganization (Bankruptcy Code) or claims process (OLA).

Claims left behind: Long-term debt: 100

- Recapitalized U.S. Bank
- Recapitalized U.S. Broker-Dealer
- Recapitalized Foreign Broker-Dealer
- Foreign Bank Branch
- Foreign Subsidiary

BHC in chapter 11 proceedings (debtor in possession) or OLA proceeding.

Transfer Pursuant to Sale Order (Bankruptcy Code) or Bridge Financial Company Authority (OLA).

Beneficiary

New HoldCo (Bridge Financial Company)

Trust

Guarantee Obligations of OpCos’ QFCs assumed by New HoldCo.
SPOE Resolution Strategy

STEP 4: TRANSFER OF OPCOS TO NEW HOLDCO / BRIDGE (cont’d)

Only some of the BHC’s liquid resources are transferred to New HoldCo / Bridge; the remainder is left behind in the BHC to cover Chapter 11 / OLA administrative expenses (not shown here). This is balance sheet for New HoldCo / Bridge. As adjusted, $1 billion is transferred to New HoldCo / Bridge, and $1 billion is left behind in the BHC’s bankruptcy estate / OLA receivership.

Capital Levels of recapitalized OpCos and New HoldCo / Bridge Financial Company exceed pre-loss levels to facilitate stabilization*

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* The New Holdco / Bridge Financial Company will be required to comply with capital requirements generally applicable to fully capitalized and open bank holding companies.
Post-Reorganization
SIZE OF REMAINING OPERATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED

U.S. G-SIBs Title I Resolution Plans—Public Section Description of Post-Resolution Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~70% reduction in overall assets,</td>
<td>Discrete businesses disposed of through combination of strategic sales, wind-downs, or transfers</td>
<td>Banking businesses divested; each divested business is significantly smaller and less systemically important</td>
<td>Firm would cease to exist post-resolution; all assets would be sold or unwound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of product offerings, global footprint and customers</td>
<td>Remaining assets, likely to consist of a fee-based operational services firm, consisting of business built around the custody business, taken public through IPO</td>
<td>Broker-dealers subject to solvent wind-down through sale or run-off</td>
<td>Only surviving businesses would be asset management, private wealth management, merchant banking businesses, special situations group, and commodities, which would have been sold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind down, sale or simplification of certain business lines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JPMorgan – SPOE</th>
<th>Morgan Stanley – SPOE</th>
<th>State Street – SPOE</th>
<th>Wells Fargo – FDIC Receivership / Bridge Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~40% reduction in main bank assets (including branches)</td>
<td>Firm would cease to exist post-resolution</td>
<td>Firm’s size and operational footprint may shrink further due to the potential sale of divestiture options</td>
<td>Sales of asset portfolios and business lines, in addition to sales of six regional portfolios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~80% reduction in broker-dealer assets; none would be systemically important</td>
<td>Sale or wind down of all businesses and material entities</td>
<td></td>
<td>IPO of surviving regional bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¼ lines of business and 8/21 sub-lines of business eliminated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72% reduction in total assets in foreign subs and branches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public Sections of 2017 Title I Resolution Plans
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## Making Banks Safe to Fail
### MAKING SPOE OPERATIONAL: PREREQUISITES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prerequisite</th>
<th>Resolution Readiness Feature(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Sufficiency of Resources in Resolution** | ✓ Capital and liquidity resources higher at the onset of material financial distress  
✓ External TLAC debt (and corresponding contributable assets)  
✓ Internal TLAC debt (prepositioning of assets, including liquid assets)  
✓ BHC bankruptcy or resolution proceeding must be commenced while capital and liquidity resources remain sufficient for SPOE resolution strategy (governance triggers) |
| **2. No QFC Closeouts** | ✓ Contractual waiver of QFC closeout rights conditioned upon timely approval of emergency motion (see below) |
| **3. Resilience of Opco Support to Legal Challenges** | ✓ Secured support agreement to provide capital and liquidity to support Opcos  
✓ Security interest in contributable assets securing Support Agreement  
✓ Prior notice/disclosure of structural changes and resolution strategy |
| **4. Timely Transfer of “Good Bank” to New (Bridge) Holdco** | ✓ Notice of proceedings  
✓ Limited relief requested  
✓ Preservation of value for the estate  
✓ No need to value consideration received  
✓ Mitigation of systemic risk  
✓ Performance of QFCs by OpCos |
| **5. Foreign Regulator Cooperation** | ✓ Meeting or exceeding minimum regulatory capital requirements at all times  
✓ Conservative assumptions about inter-affiliate transactions during the reorganization period |
TLAC consists of equity plus long-term unsecured debt that can be converted to common equity in bankruptcy.

U.S. G-SIBs now have >5 times more usable TLAC.

In 2008, long-term senior debt not usable without imposing losses pro rata on short-term senior debt (e.g., commercial paper).

Subordinated debt and Additional Tier 1 were considered unusable in 2008 because of market confusion about loss waterfall.

U.S. G-SIBs have restructured themselves to make all external unsecured long-term debt at top-tier parent level structurally or contractually junior to all external short-term debt.

Enough long-term debt (senior + subordinate) to recapitalize U.S. G-SIBs at full Basel III capital levels under conditions twice as severe as 2008.
Assuring Sufficiency of Resolution Resources

EXTERNAL TLAC: TODAY vs. 2008 (cont’d)

- External TLAC Must Be “Usable” for Resolution Purposes
  - Structurally or Contractually Subordinated to All External Short-Term (Runnable) Debt

- Fed’s Final TLAC and Clean Holding Company Rule
  - Requires External TLAC Debt To Be Structurally Subordinated With Respect to Subsidiary Creditors and Assets
  - Prohibits external short-term debt and financial contracts at top-tier parent
  - All external short-term debt and financial contracts at operating subsidiaries
  - Impact: external short-term debt has first claim on subsidiaries’ assets – ahead of external TLAC at parent level

- Secured Support Agreement
  - Creates contractual commitment by parent to recapitalize subsidiaries in distress scenario secured by a lien on parent’s cash, intercompany receivables and other financial assets (contributable assets)
  - Impact: subordinates external TLAC to parent’s “contributable assets”
Banks would have 50% more capital after absorbing losses from stress than actual capital compared to 2008…

…even if they went through an economic downturn worse than the last financial crisis…

U.S. G-SIBs have higher risk-based capital ratios today in a stressed environment than actual risk-based capital ratios in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual T1 Common</th>
<th>Stressed CET1 (from 2017 DFAST)</th>
<th>Stressed Losses (from 2017 DFAST)</th>
<th>Actual CET1</th>
<th>Actual CET1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...because today banks are starting with 2x the capital they had pre-crisis

All capital ratios presented on an aggregate (weighted average) basis. Actual T1 Common as of 12/31/2008 reflects the Tier 1 Common ratio in effect prior to Basel III for all U.S. G-SIBs. Stressed CET1 as of 12/31/2016 reflects the minimum CET1 ratio (under Basel III) under the supervisor-run severely adverse scenario, based on supervisory results of the 2017 DFAST process, for all U.S. G-SIBS. Actual CET1 reflects the reported CET1 ratio for all U.S. G-SIBs.

Sources: SNL Financial, Regulatory Filings, 2017 DFAST Results

*CET1 = Common Equity Tier 1 capital, a measurement of a bank’s core equity capital, subject to adjustments and deductions under Basel III

**DFAST = Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing
Large BHCs (>50 bn assets) have 4x more liquid assets (excess reserves plus estimates of securities that qualify as HQLAs) as a percentage of total assets compared to 2008.

Banks have reduced their reliance on short-term wholesale funding

Four new resolution planning concepts introduced in the Fed/FDIC Guidance for 2017 Resolution Plans by U.S. G-SIBs under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act address positioning of resources and triggers for recapitalization and bankruptcy:

- Resolution Capital Adequacy and Positioning ("RCAP")
- Resolution Liquidity Adequacy and Positioning ("RLAP")
- Resolution Capital Execution Need ("RCEN")
- Resolution Liquidity Execution Need ("RLEN")
Firms must “position” appropriate balance of contributable and prepositioned (internal) capital and liquidity resources during business as usual ("BAU") to anticipate a stress scenario.

When under financial stress, firms are required to make real-time projections of capital and liquidity needs of OpCos during resolution period.

Projections comparable to projections provided to debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders in a conventional bankruptcy reorganization proceeding.
Assuring Sufficiency of Resolution Resources

PROJECTING REAL TIME RESOLUTION NEEDS: RCEN AND RLEN

During a stress period, U.S. G-SIBs are required to estimate and regularly update projected capital and liquidity needed to implement SPOE Resolution based on facts unfolding in the actual stress scenario being experienced by the group.

- Projected capital resources needed at each OpCo following the BHC’s bankruptcy filing to cover projected losses while SPOE Resolution is executed:
  - Must be sufficient to ensure compliance with capital requirements applicable to each OpCo after absorbing losses both before and after commencement of bankruptcy or resolution proceedings
  - Updated daily during stress period

- Projected liquidity resources needed at each OpCo after the BHC’s bankruptcy filing to cover net liquidity outflows until liquidity levels stabilize (the “Stabilization Date”):
  - Must be sufficient to cover both:
    - cumulative net outflows during period after commencement of bankruptcy or resolution proceedings (after offsetting inflows) until Stabilization Date, and
    - peak intra-day liquidity needs
  - Updated daily during stress period

RCEN and RLEN are used to formulate triggers so action is taken while sufficient resources remain to execute SPOE Resolution.
Recapitalization Trigger occurs when the HQLAs and other assets held at the BHC or IHC level that are available for contribution to the OpCos approach the aggregate capital or liquidity needs of the OpCos based on the RCEN/RLEN shortfall calculation.

Recapitalization Trigger

Available Financial Resources

\[ \frac{\text{Available Financial Resources}}{\text{Aggregate Resource Needs}} \rightarrow 1.0 \]

Buffers are built into the trigger calculation so the recapitalization and the BHC’s bankruptcy occur while available resources remain sufficient to meet capital and liquidity needs during the resolution period.

- The precise ratio in the Recapitalization Trigger will depend upon where the buffers are built into the system (RLEN/RCEN or the recapitalization ratio).

- Upon occurrence of the Recapitalization Trigger:
  - The BHC’s remaining contributable assets are contributed to the OpCos or an IHC
  - Thereafter, the BHC files for protection under chapter 11
    - The Recapitalization Trigger is also a governance trigger for the BHC director and management action regarding the BHC’s chapter 11 proceedings
Resolution Plan Liquidity Outflow Assumptions
MODELS ASSUME RAPID DEPLETION OF HQLAs DURING RUNWAY PERIOD PRIOR TO RESOLUTION

RLAP models require U.S. G-SIBs to hold HQLAs to cover liquidity deficits (Cumulative Net Outflows) of material entities for a stress period of at least 30 days. (See note below.)

Note: Regulatory guidance provides that: "With respect to RLAP, the firm should be able to measure the stand-alone liquidity position of each material entity (including material entities that are non-U.S. branches) — i.e., the high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) at the material entity less net outflows to third parties and affiliates — and ensure that liquidity is readily available to meet any deficits. The RLAP model should cover a period of at least 30 days and reflect the idiosyncratic liquidity profile and risk of the firm. . . . The stand-alone net liquidity position of each material entity (HQLA less net outflows) should be measured using the firm’s internal liquidity stress test assumptions.” Agency Guidance for July 2017 Submissions
If no action is taken to recapitalize OpCos and resolve the firm, it may be impossible to stabilize liquidity outflows. The rate of continued decline in HQLAs will depend on actions of FMUs and counterparties, market conditions, etc.

Eventually the OpCos may run out of liquidity and fail.
If OpCos are fully recapitalized and SPOE is implemented, OpCo liquidity outflows should stabilize and access of OpCos to credit markets should return, as long as the OpCos have access to sufficient liquidity to sustain their operations until the firm’s liquidity stabilizes (the “Stabilization Date”) (see below).

The Recapitalization Trigger tests projected OpCo liquidity needs (whether based on RCEN or RLEN shortfalls) until the expected Stabilization Date against the firm’s available liquidity resources to determine when the recapitalization and the BHC’s Chapter 11 filing should occur.

* For purposes of this illustration it is assumed that, based on the daily RLEN and RCEN calculations, the G-SIB determines that the Recapitalization Trigger has occurred shortly before day 14, triggering final BHC support contributions to the OpCos, or an IHC if one is used, and BHC’s bankruptcy filing promptly thereafter.